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Abstract—Traffic safety is the foremost value that automotive
radar systems aim to pursue. Unlike in mobile communication
systems, the literature for radar systems did not adequately
address inter-radar interference and security threats such as
jamming and spoofing, which in turn threatens the traffic
safety. In this context, we introduce a novel frequency-modulated
continuous-wave (FMCW) radar scheme (namely, BlueFMCW)
that mitigates both interference and spoofing signals. BlueFMCW
randomly hops frequency to avoid interference and spoofing
signals. Our phase alignment algorithm is capable of removing
the phase discontinuity while combining the beat signals from
the randomly-hopped chirps, and thereby radar’s resolution is
not compromised. The simulation results show that BlueFMCW
can efficiently mitigate the interference and spoofing signals in
various scenarios without paying its resolution.
Index Terms—Automotive radar; FMCW; Chirp; Frequency
hopping
I. INTRODUCTION
Automotive sensor systems are considered as a key technol-
ogy in autonomous driving by detecting surrounding obstacles.
As a vital part of the sensing system, radars detect obstacles
in a long-range, compared to cameras and ultrasonic sensors
focused on shorter-range detection. In particular, radar tech-
niques [1] using radio frequency (RF) have garnered attraction
mainly thanks to its capability of detecting objects in var-
ious climate conditions. Among those, frequency-modulated
continuous-wave (FMCW) allows the radar to detect both
range and speed of objects [2], [3], which raises considerable
research interest.
However, as more vehicles are equipped with radars, the
interference will likely become a salient issue to resolve (as
illustrated in Figure. 1). An increasing number of interfering
signals between radars increases the noise floor, degrading
the radars’ accuracy. Thus, mitigation of the interference is
increasingly critical in keeping the performance of a radar
operable [4]. Radar interference can threaten the safety of
autonomous vehicles in the near future, as 50% of new vehicle
sales will be autonomous in the 2050s [5]. Autonomous
vehicles require radars for adaptive cruise control (ACC),
pedestrian detection, cross-traffic alerts, blind spot detection
(BSD), rear collision warning, etc. These features are closely
related to the safety of the vehicles.
Another significant aspect to consider in the design of an
automotive radar is security. There are two principle attacks
(i.e., intentional disruption of a vehicular system by a third-
party) on an automotive radar. First, jamming attacks have the
potential for inducing major collisions in the future. Jamming
attackers intentionally send out high power radio signal to
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Fig. 1: Threat models in automotive radar system.
confuse or overwhelm the radar receiver. Jamming attacks
make the radar out of operation by saturating the radar with
noise. However, the damage by a jamming attack can be
reduced in a highly mobile environment, making it very
difficult for an attacker to target specific vehicles [6]. Second,
automotive radars are known to be susceptible to spoofing,
replicating and retransmitting radar transmit signals designed
to provide false information to radar to corrupt received data.
Spoofing on distance and velocity on commercial automotive
radars have been shown to be feasible [7].
As the attacker is likely to use similar hardware with the
victim automotive radar, it can listen for the original radar
signal and generate a similar radar signal to confuse the
victim radar. If the attacker generates a noise-like jamming
signal to overwhelm the signal, the victim radar can detect
the attack and switch to other types of sensors to continue
driving. However, if the attacker does spoofing by transmitting
a similar signal that is not distinguishable from the original
radar signal, it can be a threat to vehicles’ safety on the road.
The ghost objects generated by the spoofing can cause the
vehicle to stop to avoid a collision. It can cause accidents or
a non-necessary slow down of traffic.
1) Related Work: There are several prior works on mitiga-
tion techniques against mutual interference or attacks on the
automotive radars. Communication-based techniques such as
dual function radar-communication [8][9] proved effectiveness
only against interference signals. Meanwhile, our proposed
work provides a countermeasure against intended attack sig-
nals as well.
As efforts to combat the radar interference or attacks,
techniques such as beamforming [10][11] and polarization
[12][13] are also found in the literature.
Further enhancements on the FMCW are found in the latest
work such as adaptive noise cancellation techniques [14],
[15], which improves the signal-to-noise-ratio by canceling
the noise from the radar interference. However, they did
not specify how to distinguish false objects created by the
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2interference or attack, which is the main problem that our
work focuses to address.
Phase-Coded FMCW (PC-FMCW) [16] is proposed to miti-
gate interference and enable joint sensing and communication.
While the phase coding enables carrying information and
mitigating the interference simultaneously, it causes phase
discontinuity on the waveforms. The realization of such wave-
forms in hardware is challenging due to the instantaneous
phase change needing costly equipment; thus, it does not apply
to the automotive radar domain straightforward.
To address the limitations of the above-mentioned tech-
niques, we introduce “BlueFMCW,” a novel FMCW mecha-
nism that features robustness against interference and spoofing
attacks simultaneously. The technique is named after Bluetooth
[17] for the frequency hopping to avoid interfering signals.
Bluetooth randomly switches the frequency over 79 channels
between 2400 and 2483.5 MHz at a rate of 1600 hops per
second. We adopt the frequency hopping to a radar system, in
which way multiple radars can share a same band without
interference thanks to the random hopping pattern. It also
makes the BlueFMCW robust against spoofing attacks by
making attackers not easily able to decrypt key parameters
such as a random hopping pattern.
The idea of using a random waveform to mitigate the
interference has been proposed before this paper. A recent
work proposed an amplitude-modulated chirp waveform for
a transmitted signal [18]. It exploits a hash function for the
amplitude modulation and the pulse repetition period to avoid
the interfering signal. Nonetheless, due to reliance on a precise
control of the amplitude, its performance under noise cannot
be guaranteed. Another recent proposal introduced a FMCW
mechanism based on a random chirp signal [19]. It divides the
pulse into N smaller chirp chips while randomly switching
the starting frequencies of each chip. The limitation is that the
resolution is sacrificed by the number of sub-chirps, focusing
on confusing attackers by hopping the frequency and using
the information from a single chirp chip. It still leaves the
proposal vulnerable to a spoofing attack.
To this end, we use a frequency hopping method where all
the best signals from the sub-chirps are aggregated. It enables
us to achieve N times higher resolution than using a single
chirp chip. Our work also effectively suppresses the in-band
spoofing or interference signal by spreading out their energy.
2) Contributions: We summarize the contributions of
BlueFMCW as follows.● BlueFMCW efficiently avoids both interference signals
and spoofing attacks.● BlueFMCW does not degrade the resolution because of
the random frequency hopping.● Phase alignment algorithm is provided to resolve the
phase discontinuity problem caused by random frequency
hopping.● BlueFMCW is compatible with conventional FMCW
radars.
3) Organization: This paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II covers the background of FMCW radar and adversary
model. Section III details the design of BlueFMCW radar.
Sections IV presents performance evaluation of BlueFMCW
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Fig. 2: Ranging distances using FMCW. The figure shows
the transmitted FMCW signal (blue) and its reflection (red).
The time-of-flight (τ ) between the two signals maps to the
frequency shift ∆f .
radar compared with baseline methods. Section V. related
works, and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FMCW radar
FMCW radar continuously transmits periodic pulses whose
frequency sweeps linearly in time, as shown by the blue line
in Figure 2. Mathematically, the transmitted signal is
st(t) = exp(j2pi(fct + α
2
t2)) (1)
where fc and α are the starting frequency and slope of the
FMCW chirp, respectively. The reflected signal is a time-
delayed version of the transmitted signal, which arrives after
bouncing off a reflector, as illustrated by the red line shown
in Figure 2. The time-of-flight (TOF, τ ) is an elapsed time
for the transmitted signal, traveling the round-trip distance 2d
from the radar to the reflector and back to the radar. In the
presence of multiple reflectors, the received signal is written
as sr(t) = ΣAist(t− τi), where Ai and τi are the attenuation
factor and TOF of the ith reflector. The receiver mixes the
transmitted signal with the received signal to produce a beat
signal x(t) = sr(t) ⋅st(t)∗. Plugging the above two equations,
the beat signal becomes
x(t) =∑
i
Ai exp(j2pi(ατit + fcτ − α
2
τ2i )). (2)
This enables us to extract a distance profile of multiple
reflectors because the frequency of the beat signal is ατ where
α is a known parameter. Hence, we can perform the FFT on
the beat signal and detect the objects by finding the peaks.
The resolution of FMCW is defined by the ability to dis-
tinguish two objects close to each other. Since their distances
are proportional to their frequency shifts ∆f , the resolution
of distance ∆d is a function of the ability to distinguish
two frequency shifts. The resolution of differentiating two
frequencies ∆fmin is equal to the size of a single FFT bin.
When the FFT is taken over a chirp-duration T , the size of
one FFT bin is equal to 1/T . Hence, the distance resolution
is ∆d = C⋅∆fmin
2α
= C
2αT
= C
2B
, where B is the frequency
bandwidth equal to αT . It is important to note that the
resolution of FMCW is a function of the bandwidth of the
transmitted signal.
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Fig. 3: Transmitted signal and beat signal of (a)(c) conven-
tional FMCW versus (b)(d) BlueFMCW .
B. Adversary models
In this paper, we assume two adversary models. In the first
model, a victim radar can be attacked by a spoofing signal
intentionally generated by a malicious radar. The attacker can
listen to the victim radar and replicate the identical signal
to manipulate the ranging capability. Given that the technical
standards of the conventional FMCW system (modulation
type, carrier frequency, bandwidth, and pulse period) are
known, the attacker can synchronize with the victim radar.
[20] recently demonstrates that the distance-spoofing attack on
FMCW is feasible with low-cost off-the-shelf hardware. In the
second model, two or more radars with identical parameters
interfere with each other. It is assumed that a given model of
vehicles would equip the same radar for the entire production.
In this scenario, the interference is unintentional but can be
accidentally synchronized with the other radars.
In both scenarios, the victim radar would falsely detect an
object, i.e. a ghost object. Figure 3 (a) and (c) shows an
example of the ghost object in the conventional FMCW radar.
As the adversary signal (either by spoofing or interference)
has the same slope of the original chirp signal, a false tone is
created in the beat signal shown in Figure 3 (c).
In this paper, we will use the notation adversary signals to
represent both spoofing and interference signals that create a
ghost object at the victim radar.
III. BLUEFMCW
To address the above adversary scenarios, we introduce
BlueFMCW, a radar system that mitigates the adversary
signals. Specifically, instead of transmitting a full chirping
signal from the lower to upper frequency, BlueFMCW makes
a random-frequency-jump in the middle of the chirp signal as
shown in Figure 3 (b). While the TOF of the reflected signals
remains the same, the frequency gap with the adversary signal
will be randomized. As a result, the false beat frequency does
not stay at the same FFT bin shown in Figure 3 (d). In other
words, the energy of the adversary signal will be randomly
dispersed over various FFT bins, which results in significantly
smaller peaks in the spectrum.
In this section, we first describe how to perform random
frequency hopping in FMCW. We then address the chal-
lenges to reconstruct the beat signal. Finally, we discuss how
BlueFMCW performs with different parameters and choose an
optimal configuration.
A. Random Frequency Hopping
Consider a conventional FMCW chirp signal, i.e., linear
frequency modulation signal from a starting frequency fc for
T duration. BlueFMCW creates a series of frequency-hopping
chirps by (1) dividing the conventional FMCW signal into N
equal sub-intervals, and then (2) randomly permuting the sub-
chirps. Suppose the victim radar receives a reflected signal
from a real object and an adversary signal that spawns a ghost
target. Figure 3 (c) and (d) shows the victim’s spectrograms of
the conventional FMCW and BlueFMCW. The beat frequency
from the adversary signal remains constant through T in the
conventional FMCW. In contrast, BlueFMCW can hash the
beat frequency thanks to its randomized staring frequencies
of the sub-chirps. However, the beat frequency from the real
object is not hashed and remains constant through T . This
is because the beat frequency of a true object only depends
on the TOF regardless of the starting frequency. BlueFMCW
leverages this to mitigate the adversary signal while achieving
the same detection capability on the real objects.
To formalize this, we first denote the starting frequency of
the kth sub-chirp to be fk. For the random frequency hopping,
we can define a random permutation σ ∶ F → F , where F is
a finite set of the index 1,2, ...,N . The two-line notation of σ
can be written as:
( 1 2 ... N
σ(1) σ(2) ... σ(N)) (3)
Figure 4 (a) illustrates an example of BlueFMCW sub-
chirps with N = 4. In this example, the first sub-chirp of the
conventional FMCW is permuted to the third slot, the second
sub-chirp to the second slot, the third sub-chirp to the first slot,
and the fourth sub-chirp to the third slot. In the next section,
we will discuss the impact of the phase discontinuity of the
beat signal and how we can reconstruct the original beat signal
using the inverse permutation.
B. Reconstruction
1) Challenges: Resolution and Discontinuities: By observ-
ing the pattern of the BlueFMCW spectrogram, one can
speculate which one is the true object or adversary signal. The
true object tends to have a consistent peak frequency while
the adversary signal jumps from one to another frequency.
Using this observation, one can estimate a rough distance
profile from the single sub-chirp’s beat signal. However, the
distance resolution of a sub-chirp is degraded by N because
its bandwidth is reduced by B/N . As discussed in Section II,
the distance resolution achieved by a single sub-chirp becomes
cN
2B
.
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Fig. 4: Frequency hopping by permutation and its beat signal. (a) shows an example of the transmitted BlueFMCW signal
(N = 4). The sub-chirps are permuted by σ. (b) shows the beat signals in the time-domain. xalign is achieved by inverse-
permuting xnaive. (c) shows the conventional FMCW and its beat signal. (d) shows an example of frequency hopping in
BlueFMCW and the phase discontinuity in its beat signal.
A naive attempt to solve the resolution problem is simply
concatenating the beat signals of all sub-chirps in time-order
such as
xnaive(t) = [x1(t), x2(t), ..., xN(t)] (4)
where xk(t) is the beat signal by k-th sub-chirp. By con-
catenating all N beat signals as illustrated in Figure 4 (b), the
resolution will remain the same with the conventional FMCW,
c
2B
. It will create, however, spurious frequency components in
the frequency domain. To understand why, we need to examine
the phase of the beat signal. Recall the beat signal from Eq. 2.
For simplicity, we can rewrite the beat signal of the k-th sub-
chirp with a single reflection:
xk(t) = exp(j2pi(ατt + fkτ − ατ2/2)) , t ∈ [0, T /N] (5)
The phase in frequency is written as:
φ = 2pi(fkτ − ατ2/2) (6)
Figure 4 (c) shows an example of the conventional FMCW.
As can be seen, the conventional FMCW signal is a special
case of BlueFMCW where fk’s are sorted in ascending order.
Hence, we can represent x2(t) in two ways; one with Eq. 5
and the other with the T /N advanced version of Eq. 2.
x2(t) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩exp(j2pi(ατt + f2τ − ατ
2/2)) by Eq. 5
exp(j2pi(ατ(t + T /N) + f1τ − ατ2/2)) by Eq. 2
(7)
For the conventional FMCW, the phases of the two equation
always the same.
2pi(f2τ − ατ2/2) = 2pi(ατT /N + f1τ − ατ2/2) (8)
The two phases are always identical in the conventional
FMCW because f2 is equal to f1 + αT /N .
However, if the sub-chirps are randomly permuted, it is not
guaranteed that fk+1 is equal to fk + αT /N . This will cause
phase discontinuities as shown in Figure 4 (d). We will address
this issue in the following section.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Real objects
Adversary signal
(a) Regular FMCW
(b) BlueFMCW without phase alignment
(c) BlueFMCW with phase alignment
objects
interference
Adversary signal spreads out
Fig. 5: Beat spectrum (distance profile) of (a) conventional
FMCW, (b) BlueFMCW wihtout phase alignment, and (c)
BlueFMCW with phase alignment.
2) Phase Alignment: To eliminate the phase discontinuity
due to the frequency hopping, BlueFMCW re-arranges the beat
signals by inverting the permutation used in the frequency
hopping. For example in Figure 4 (a), the first sub-chirp of
the conventional FMCW (starting frequency f1) was permuted
to the fourth time-slot. If we concatenate the beat signals in
time-order, the beat signal starting at f1 comes at the last
place, causing the phase discontinuity. As we know how the
sub-chirp was permuted (σ), we can invert the permutation to
bring the beat signal back to the correct time-slot so that the
phase becomes continuous. By the inverse permutation σ−1,
the fourth beat signal is permuted to the first time-slot, and so
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Fig. 6: Comparing the spectrogram of the beat signal with
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tion. The beat spectrum results are compared in (c).
the others (Figure 4 (b)).
Formally, the phase aligned beat signal, xalign, is achieved
by performing the inverse permutation σ−1 on the time-order
beat signals, xnaive.
xnaive(t) = [x1, x2, ..., xN ] (9)
xalign(t) = [xσ−1(1), xσ−1(2), ..., xσ−1(N)] (10)
Figure 5 shows the impact of the phase alignment in the
beat spectrum. In this example, two true objects and one
adversary signal are simulated. The conventional FMCW in
Figure 5 (a) images all three components in the spectrum. In
Figure 5 (b), the spectrum of xnaive is shown. Due to the
phase discontinuity, we can observe many spurious signals
around the objects and the smaller and unclear peaks for the
true objects. After the phase alignment, Figure 5 (c) shows two
clear peaks of the objects. Note that both BlueFMCWs with
and without phase alignment can alleviate the adversary signal.
This is because random frequency hopping makes random
frequency gaps against the adversary, and thus the result beat
frequencies also become randomized whether phase-aligned
or not. The mitigated adversary signal, however, did not
disappear. Instead of persisting at one frequency, the adversary
signal is randomly dispersed over the various frequencies.
C. Designing BlueFMCW
In the previous section, we showed that BlueFMCW can
spread out the adversary signal while holding the phase
continuity of the reflected signals from the real objects. We
assume the sub-chirps share the same slope (α) and duration
(Tb) for the simplicity. In addition, the frequency support of
each sub-chirp must be mutual exclusive in order to align the
phase by the permutation. For example, if a frequency support
overlaps with another, the phase cannot be aligned without
dropping the overlapping samples. For the opposite case, if
there are empty gaps among the frequency supports, the phase
alignment again cannot be achieved without interpolating the
missing samples. Thus, having the frequency supports to be
mutual exclusive each other and to cover the full bandwidth
makes the problems easy.
The question remains how diverse BlueFMCW can spread
out the adversary signals. To maximize the spread, we want
to avoid the adversary signals falling in the same FFT bin.
By properly choosing the sub-chirp parameters, the down-
converted adversary signals fall into many different FFT bins.1
As a result, the energy of the adversary signal will be widely
spread over the bandwidth. In the opposite case, when the
adversary signals fall at a few identical FFT bins, they will
end up with high-magnitude tones in FFT.
The beat frequency of an adversary signal in FFT can
be represented by the starting frequencies of the victim and
aggressor (interferer or attacker), the bandwidth of the sub-
chirps (Bsub = αTb), and the sampling rate (fs).
fbeat =mod(∆f + kBsub, fs) , k = 0,1,2...,N − 1 (11)
where ∆f is the frequency difference between the transmitted
signal and the received adversary signal, and k is an integer
dependent on the permutation. In the conventional FMCW,
m is zero for the entire chirp duration which makes the beat
frequency constant. Since ∆f is dependent on the distance,
the starting frequency of the aggressor, and the delay of the
adversary signal, BlueFMCW does not have control over it.
However, BlueFMCW can configure Bsub and fs. Assume
they are set to Bsub = nmfs where m and n are the integers. To
calculate fbeat, consider the argument of the modulo operation
in Eq. 11 as
∆f + kBsub
fs
= ∆f
fs
+ kn
m
(12)
= Q®
Quotient
+ δf + p
m´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
remainder
(13)
where Q is the quotient of the division, and δf + p
m
is the
remainder where p is an integer such that −m < p < m. We
can use the above result to rewrite the beat frequency as
fbeat = (δf + p
m
)fs (14)
Note that δf is the constant remainder from ∆f
fs
that does
not impact on the diversity. Therefore, there exists at most
m different fbeat. For the worst case example (m = 1),
consider N = 4, fs = 100MHz, Bsub = 2fs = 200MHz,
and ∆f = 70MHz. No matter how we hop the frequency, the
remainder is 70/100, and thereby fbeat is always 70MHz. For
a better configuration (m = 3), consider Bsub = 73fs with the
1In order to highlight the impact of sub-chirp design, we assume a worst-
case scenario that the out-of-band adversary signal after the receiver mixer
can be leaked to ADC and cause aliasing spectrum in the FFT. In practice,
the LPF can filter out most of the out-of-band signals.
6TABLE I: Experimental Setup
Parameter Value
FMCW
fc 24 GHz
Sampling rate 20 MHz
Chirp duration 204.8 µs
# of total samples 4096
Slope (optimal) 24.785 MHz/µs
Slope (non-optimal) 26.562 MHz/µs
BlueFMCW
# of sub-chirps 32
Sub-chirp duration 6.4 µs
Aggressor
# of Aggressors 1-10
Distance (m) Unif(0.5, 200)
SIR(dB) Unif(2.5, 6)
Static object Distance 25 m
same setup for the rest. For k = 0,1,2,3, the remainders are
70/100, 70/100+1/3, 70/100+2/3, and 70/100, respectively.
Therefore, we can achieve 3 different fbeat as m is set to 3.
Figure 6 (a) shows the BlueFMCW spectrogram of the worst
case. Clearly, the adversary is not spread even with the random
frequency hopping. This is because fs and Bsub have the
integer relationship with m = 1. The red lines in Figure 6
(c) correspond to the reconstruction result by the worst case.
Figure 6 (b) shows the BlueFMCW spectrogram of m = 131.
Compared to the worst case, the adversary signal is spread
on 131 different beat frequencies. As a result, the adversary
signal is greatly reduced as shown in the blue lines in Figure 6
(c).
IV. RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
We conducted a simulation on Matlab to evaluate
BlueFMCW’s ability to mitigate the adversary signals. The
victim radar is configured with the starting frequency 24GHz,
20MHz sampling rate, and 4096 number of samples. We
choose two slope rates of the chirp; 24.785 MHz/us for the
optimal configuration and 26.562 MHz/us for the non-optimal.
In this simulation, BlueFMCW divides the chirp into 32 sub-
chirps and randomly permutes them while sharing the common
FMCW parameters. The static object is located at distance of
25 meters. We simulated 10 different numbers of the aggressor
radars, 1-10 aggressors. The distance to the aggressors is
randomly chosen between 0.5-200 meters. The power of the
aggressor signal is also randomly generated to have SIR
between 2.5-6 dB. Table I summarizes the experimental setup.
B. Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate the performance of BlueFMCW along two
axes. The first is how well it can mitigate the adversary. In
this case, our metric is the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR)
defined by the ratio between the signal power of the true object
and the strongest interference signal seen in the beat frequency
domain. The higher the SIR, the better BlueFMCW mitigates
the adversary signals.
The second metric is the signal-to-interference-plus-noise-
ratio (SINR) loss. BlueFMCW spreads the adversary signals
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Fig. 7: Beat spectrum under (a) CvC (b) BvC (c) BvB
scenario.
across the bandwidth. This will end up increasing noise floor,
i.e. decreasing SINR. We first calculate the SINR of the con-
ventional FMCW without any adversary signals, SINRbase.
Then, we compare SINRbase with the SINR degraded by
adversary signals.
SINRloss conv = SINRbase − SINRconv (15)
SINRloss blue = SINRbase − SINRblue (16)
C. Compare Scenarios
We compare the following scenarios:● Conventional FMCW vs Conventioanl FMCW’s
(CvC): The victim radar and aggressor radars (interferers
or attackers) use the conventional FMCW.● BlueFMCW vs Conventioanl FMCW’s (BvC): The
victim radar uses BlueFMCW, but the aggressor radars
use the conventional FMCW.● BlueFMCW vs BlueFMCW’s (BvB): The victim radar
and aggressor radars use BlueFMCW. However, they do
not share the random permutation.
In addition, we evaluate the impact of the phase alignment
and the BlueFMCW design on the performance.
D. Adversary Mitigation Performance
Impact of the number of attackers: We first demonstrate the
impact of the number of adversary signals on the performance
of BlueFMCW. We compare the above three scenarios across
the number of adversaries. The distance of the aggressor radars
and the power of the adversary signals follow the uniform
distribution in Table I. Each case repeats 100 runs. One of
the beat spectrum of the three scenarios with 10 adversary
signals are compared in Fig 7. The red dotted line represents
the distance of the real object. As shown in Fig 7 (a), the
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Fig. 8: 50th percentile SIR as the number of adversary
signals varies.
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Fig. 9: SIR for different scenarios.
victim radar with the first scenario (all radars are conventional
FMCW) has no capability of mitigating the adversary signals.
However, when the victim radar uses BlueFMCW, it can
suppress the adversary significantly regardless of the aggressor
radar type as shown in Fig 7 (b) and (c). Fig 8 shows the
50th percentile SIR as a function of the number of adversary
signals. As the number of adversaries increases, BlueFMCW
is able to uphold the high SIR in both BvC and BvB scenarios.
On the otherhand, the conventional FMCW is unable to
mitigate a single adversary signal. Fig 9 plots the CDF of the
SIRs of the three scenarios. BlueFMCW can achieve the 50th
percentile SIR of 18.75 dB for BvB scenario and 18.93dB for
BvC scenario. Whereas in CvC scenario, the 50th percentile
SIR is around 2dB.
Impact of the phase alignment: Next we evaluate the impact
of the phase alignment on the performance of BlueFMCW. In
Section III-B2, we explain that the phase alignment reduces the
discontinuities as combining the received signals to improve
the distance resolution. Fig 10 plots the CDF of SIR gain
with and without the phase alignment. The figure shows that
the phase alignment can improve SIR more than 7dB. This is
because the phase discontinuity is minimized by the alignment,
and therefore there are less spurs introduced by the true object
signals.
Optimal vs Non-optimal configuration: In this experiment,
we evaluate the performance of BlueFMCW with different
chirp parameters. As explained in Section III-C, we can
configure BlueFMCW chirp to spread the adversary signal
on more or less distinctive beat frequencies, i.e. how well
it can disperse the adversary on the noise floor. Spreading
the adversary signal on more number of distinctive beat
frequencies will increase SIR. Fig 11 compares the CDF of
SIR when BlueFMCW spreads the adversary signal on (i)
131 possible beat frequencies (optimal configuration), and
(ii) 2 possible beat frequencies (non-optimal configuration).
We only changed the slope of the chirp while fixing the
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Fig. 10: SIR with and without phase alignment.
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Fig. 11: SIR with optimal and non-optimal configuration.
rest configuration as shown in Table I. This will effectively
change the bandwidth of the FMCW chirp. The non-optimal
configuration degrades the median SIR by 7 dB and the 10th
percentile SIR by 9 dB. This is due to the fact that there are
only two possible beat frequencies where the adversary energy
falls onto. In contrast, the optimal configuration can create 131
possible beat frequencies and the adversary signals have more
location to be spread out.
E. SINR Degradation
So far, we focus on the adversary mitigation performance
of BlueFMCW by measuring SIR gain. In this experiment,
we want to understand how the dispersed adversary signal
will impact on the noise level. We first calculate the SINR of
the conventional FMCW without any adversary, which serves
as the base line. Then, we compare the base SINR with the
SINR by the conventional FMCW and BlueFMCW interfered
by an aggressor. Fig 12 compares the CDF of SINR loss of
the conventional FMCW and BlueFMCW. The figure shows
both cases have almost same amount of the SINR loss. This
suggests that the energy of the adversary is not either created
nor destroyed. BlueFMCW spreads the energy of the adversary
into many frequencies so that none of them creates a strong
peak. This will effectively increase the noise floor which is to
pay in BlueFMCW. However, increasing the noise floor is a
less critical problem than detecting a ghost object.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced BlueFMCW, a novel radar sys-
tem that can efficiently mitigate both spoofing and interference
signals without compromising radar’s resolution. Our simula-
tion results demonstrated that BlueFMCW can significantly
improve the SINR ratio compared to the conventional FMCW
system. Moving forward, we are interested in implementing
BlueFMCW in hardware to prove its feasibility.
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Fig. 12: SINR loss of BlueFMCW vs conventional FMCW.
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